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This research-in-progress note reports on the design and 
execution of a study in HCI-based deception detection. 
The objective of the study is to examine the impact of 
knowledge of tracking and countermeasures on the neuro-
motor changes detected when subjects commit a 
malfeasant act. To examine this, an experimental context 
and design was required that would afford the subjects an 
opportunity to commit an un-sanctioned malicious act 
while tracking ground truth in an unobtrusive manner. 
The experimental design, study execution, and 
preliminary results are presented. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
Deception and malfeasance are endemic in our world 
today. Crime and terror threats are never far from top of 
mind and the enhanced security measures put in place in 
reaction impact us all on almost a daily basis. Above and 
beyond questions of law enforcement, safety, and 
security, the economic costs of malfeasance can be 
staggering. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
estimates that in 2018 the typical organization loses 5% of 
their revenues to fraud (ACFE 2018) and the insurance 
industry alone is estimated to have lost over $80 billion in 
2015 (Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 2015). 
Individual instances can be much more spectacular and 
                                                          
1 This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation 
under Grant No. SES-1615696 (SaTC). The authors disclose an outside 
interest in Neuro-ID, Inc. Conflicts resulting from this interest are being 
managed by The University of Arizona in accordance with its policies. 
expensive (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) and can 
systematically infiltrate and undermine entire 
organizations such as Wells Fargo with their fake 
accounts scandal (Conti-Brown 2017). In addition, insider 
threats have become one of the most critical threats facing 
government agencies and corporations (Gorman 2014). 
To address these threats, new approaches to screening are 
needed. As information technology has revolutionized the 
conduct of business operations, it is now poised to 
dramatically alter security and screening processes. 
Specifically, research into the use of information systems 
for deception detection has grown substantially in scope 
in recent years (Nunamaker Jr et al. 2016). Systems that 
utilize technologies such as eye tracking (Proudfoot et al. 
2016), facial recognition (Su and Levine 2016), and 
linguistic analysis (Burgoon et al. 2016) are increasingly 
being tested and deployed from the lab into real world 
usage. Previous work has indicated that such deviant 
behaviors can also be detected using commonly available 
human-computer interaction (HCI) devices such as 
computer mice (Hibbeln et al. 2014, 2017). When an 
individual engages in a deviant behavior there are 
multiple impacts on their cognitive processes. These 
impacts manifest as changes in the motor nervous system. 
These changes are detectable by analyzing movement 
information collected from HCI devices. The use of 
commonly available HCI devices offers options for 
deployment of such behavioral monitoring systems at 
scale. Expensive eye-tracking hardware or special 
cameras are not required – merely software that captures 
and analyzes the appropriate data from the HCI device. 
Systems that flag such HCI behaviors are being 
commercialized and evaluated for use in multiple 
contexts. These systems work by generating a baseline of 
a user's movements while they are engaged in innocuous 
activity and comparing that baseline to their movements 
when they answer questions relevant to the risky 
behavior. These systems are being deployed in 
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commercial contexts, such as loan underwriting, and 
national security contexts, such as insider threat detection. 
When deploying such a system in practice, a common 
concern that arises is that of countermeasures. We define 
countermeasures in this context to mean the use of 
movement techniques designed to defeat the ability of a 
mouse movement tracking system to infer valid results. In 
other words, what happens when users know that they are 
being monitored and attempt to defeat the system? To 
address this question, we conducted an experiment in 
which we gave subjects the opportunity to choose to 
perform a malfeasant act (i.e., cheating) in a context in 
which we could know ground truth without overly 
intrusive monitoring. This preliminary report focuses on 
the context and experimental design to achieve these 
objectives. 
BACKGROUND 
This research is an extension of previous work in HCI-
based detection of cognitive states and deception (Hibbeln 
et al. 2017; Jenkins et al. 2019). As in these previous 
studies, we leverage Attentional Control Theory (ACT) 
and the Response Activation Model (RAM) to connect 
these cognitive and emotional effects to motor-nervous 
system phenomena that are measurable using HCI 
devices. ACT states that experiencing negative emotions 
leads one's attention to shift from being goal directed to 
being stimulus driven (Eysenck et al. 2007). As a result, 
additional cognitive resources are consumed, leading to a 
degradation of motor performance (see Hibbeln et al. 
2017). RAM states that as possible movement choices are 
entered into working memory, the motor-nervous system 
pre-plans destinations and sub-movements. This pre-
planning shows up as increased changes to the actual 
trajectories taken in response to questions about malicious 
acts (i.e., less movement accuracy). Thus, we would 
expect to see similar changes to motor nervous system 
metrics as in the previous work (e.g., greater deviation 
and distance for cheaters than for non-cheaters). For this 
study, our research questions was how these effects 
change as additional information is provided to subjects 
about the fact that they are being tracked, the nature of the 
tracking, and potential countermeasures to the system. 
METHOD 
The system we used to track movements is derived from a 
commercial system. A small JavaScript is embedded in 
web pages containing the questions to which the user 
responds. Our system collects the same raw data as the 
commercial system – XY coordinates and timestamps. 
The raw data is then uploaded to a cloud-hosted analysis 
engine. The commercial system uses the raw data to 
generate an extensive set of features, analyzes them, and 
then generates results using proprietary algorithms. For 
this analysis, we restrict the features to a limited set of 
indicators (i.e., maximum deviation, normalized area-
under-the-curve, and normalized additional distance). 
Task 
Next, a task was needed in which the user could decide to 
commit a deviant act. It is important that the user be able 
to choose whether or not to commit the act. Since the 
detection system relies on cognitive and emotional 
responses to generate the changes in the motor nervous 
system, it is crucial that the deviant act not be sanctioned 
by the experimenters. If the act is sanctioned, the subjects 
will not have the underlying psychological and 
physiological responses to having performed something 
deviant – they will "know" that what they did was 
authorized. This requirement makes it a challenge to 
design an experimental task. The subject must be left free 
to decide whether or not to perform the deviant act. This 
also increases required sample sizes since subjects who do 
not decide to perform the deviant act above and beyond 
those needed for a statistically valid comparison group are 
effectively wasted. 
To encourage participants to perform the deviant act, the 
nature of the task needs to be something they feel they 
can "get away with." By obfuscating the participants' 
activity, they are given a sense of freedom to perform an 
act that they might otherwise not perform due to social or 
legal pressure. The realities of performing experimental 
research using human subjects restricts the types of 
deviant acts available. We needed one that would be 
sufficiently frowned upon to evoke the desired cognitive 
and emotional responses, yet not so far gone as to do 
lasting psychological damage from having committed it. 
We chose to create a simulated intelligence test. This test 
consisted of multiple choice and fill-in-the-blank 
questions. This instrument is appropriate as there are 
many of these types of tests available online and the 
outcomes are of interest to participants without directly 
leading to potential tangible harms. 
To properly analyze the outcomes of the experiment 
sessions, we must know the ground truth – did the 
participant cheat or not? If the decision as to whether to 
perform the deviant act is left up to the subject and the 
task is designed to allow suitable expectation that they 
will not be immediately caught and sanctioned for such 
performance another challenge arises – knowing if they 
actually performed the act. If it is obvious to the 
participant that their actions will be detected, they may 
not decide to perform the deviant act. We could have 
attempted to create additional software that would detect 
if a user visited a different web page. Alternatively, we 
could have attempted to generate cookies or another 
tracking mechanism that would have allowed us to 
correlate visits to our cheating websites. Neither of these 
approaches were satisfactory given the variety of 
mechanisms a user could have used to cheat. For 
example, a user filling out the intelligence test on a 
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desktop or laptop could have searched for the answers 
using their smartphone. In other words, attempting to 
track the process or mechanism by which they cheated 
would be a losing battle. In order to be as certain as 
possible that the user cheated, we needed the actual 
outcome of the interaction to be useful to determine if 
they cheated. To do this, we created the fake intelligence 
test in such a way that the only way to achieve a top score 
would be to cheat. 
To accomplish this, we designed the test with easy, hard, 
and impossible questions. Easy questions are questions 
that anyone should be able to answer; e.g., what is 2+2? 
Hard questions are questions that it is not likely that 
someone would know, but ultimately possible to know; 
e.g., obscure facts. Impossible questions are questions that 
it is not possible for someone to know the answer unless 
they cheat; e.g., made up facts (e.g., "Dr. Jeffrey Zaverik 
is noted for the discover of which of the following?"). We 
then created websites containing the answers to all types 
of questions and posted them online. We performed 
Search Engine Optimization (SEO)2 to help insure the 
sites would be easy to find with a Google or Bing search. 
Two websites were created: one was designed to look like 
the vendor of the test had placed sample questions online 
(Figure 1); the second was designed to look like a third 
party was sharing the answers. These two types of sites 
were selected as they exhibit face validity – i.e., it is 
reasonable that they would exist and have the answers 
posted. 
 
                                                          
2 The SEO process led us to iteratively revise our questions. For 
example, we originally had a question: "Dr. Jeffery Smith is noted for 
the discovery of which of the following?" We ultimately changed 
"Smith" to the made up and unique name "Zaverik" such that it could 
become a unique keyword for the search engine and be more likely to 
return our sites. 
Figure 1: Cheating Website 
Since there was no way a participant could know the 
answers to the impossible questions, if they got them 
correct they either guessed or cheated. We placed five 
impossible questions on the test, four multiple-choice and 
one fill in the blank. Each multiple-choice question had 
five possible answers, thus the odds of guessing an 
individual question are 1/5 = 20%. The fill-in-the-blank 
question asked for a single letter (The most used letter in 
the Nekmunnit language is translated to which letter in 
English?), thus the odds of guessing correctly are 1/26 = 
3.85%. The combined probability of getting all five 
correct by guessing is 1/16,250. For a participant to guess 
three of the four multiple choice questions and the fill-in-
the-blank question correctly, the odds are 1/3,250. We 
anticipated using on the order of 750 participants (50 per 
cell * 5 conditions / 33% estimated cheat rate = 750), thus 
we felt it appropriate to deem anyone having answered 
three or four of the multiple choice and the single fill-in-
the-blank question correct as having cheated. After further 
pilot testing we dropped the hard category since it did not 
contribute anything to the cheating calculation and just 
made the test longer. We also stopped randomly selecting 
questions from a pool. We did this in order to more easily 
be able to score the questionnaires in real time to assign 
subject payments. In addition, we judged the additional 
control we gained from being able to tweak the questions 
outweighed any risk of order effects. 
Measurement 
Following the fake IQ test questions, we first asked the 
participants a series of demographic questions (such as 
gender and world region). These questions serve to collect 
demographic information to use in the subsequent 
baseline questions. We then asked the participants to 
confirm their demographic information with a series of 
Yes/No questions. These questions serve to calculate the 
baseline movement information as there is no reason to 
expect that someone would be deceptive about confirming 
information that they just provided. Next, we asked the 
participants the risk relevant questions (i.e., "I cheated on 
the intelligence test", "I looked up answers while 
completing the test"). We asked about cheating in 
multiple ways since our early pilots indicated that 
different individuals may have different interpretations of 
what it means to cheat. 
Manipulation 
In order to instantiate countermeasures in our context we 
gave participants varying degrees of awareness of the 
tracking. This manipulation was inserted immediately 
before the participants were asked the demographic 
questions described above. The control group (Group 0) 
was given no knowledge that their mouse movements 
were being tracked. The first condition (Group 1) was told 
simply that they were being tracked: 
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Please note: We capture your interaction data (e.g., 
mouse movements) and use this information in order to 
identify those who are being deceptive when answering 
these questions. 
The second condition (Group 2) was given additional 
details about what we were looking at: 
Interaction data attributes that we monitor include: 
• Behavioral indicators such as hesitation, switching 
answers, skipping questions and returning, etc… 
• Movement indicators such as click accuracy, deviations 
from ideal trajectories, number of clicks, hesitations, 
etc… 
The third condition (Group 3) was shown all of the above 
plus was shown images of what the monitored attributes 





Figure 3: Group 3 Manipulation (example) 
The fourth condition (Group 4) was shown all of the 
above, plus was shown images of what some potential 
countermeasure strategies might look like (e.g., Figure 4). 
 
Try to be super smooth and 
consistent on all questions 
 
Try to move constantly to 
mask any changes 
Figure 4: Group 4 Manipulation (example) 
Subjects 
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate and graduate 
classes at a large public university in the southwest of the 
United States. Students are a good choice for this work as 
they are broadly similar to the population as a whole in 
terms of their technology familiarity and propensity to 
interact with online systems. In addition, they are good 
subjects since they are relatively homogenous, facilitating 
experimental control and internal validity (Dennis and 
Valacich 2001). We initially followed the standard 
practice of working with instructors to offer extra credit in 
their classes to subjects for participation. This serves to 
catch the attention of potential participants and motivate 
them to sign up. Then, we planned to use variable pay to 
incentivize the desired behavior (i.e., cheating on the test). 
In our initial pilot tests, we had 15 questions on the test; 
five easy, five hard, and five impossible. Subjects were 
paid $5 to participate and then $1 per correct answer. The 
idea was to motivate the participants to get as many 
correct answers as possible to maximize their payment. 
After piloting the experiment with these incentives, we 
found that the rates of cheating were much lower than 
anticipated (5-10%). We reviewed the responses 
individually from the pilots and found that once 
participants encountered a hard or impossible question, 
they simply gave up. To get our cheating rates up to our 
target range (25-30%) needed for adequate sample sizes, 
we first upped the financial incentive. In the next pilot, 
instead of giving $1 per correct answer, we gave a $15 
bonus for correctly answering all of the questions (100% 
correct). Our rates were still in the 5-10% range and the 
pattern of answers was similar – i.e., participants 
appeared to just give up. 
We posit that the participants were being primarily 
motivated by the extra credit they were receiving just for 
participating and that this was overshadowing the 
financial incentives. Monetary incentives will induce 
effort if cognitive and motivation mechanisms are aligned 
(e.g., expected utility, goals, self-efficacy) (Bonner and 
Sprinkle 2002). The expected utility of cash is always 
greater than no cash, however, misaligned goals can 
overwhelm this effect (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). In our 
case, the participant's goal was to gain extra credit in their 
course and thus was misaligned with the monetary 
incentive leading to lack of effort. To test this 
explanation, we ran another pilot where we specifically 
asked the instructors whose classes we recruited from to 
not offer extra credit for participation. Our sign-up rates 
were accordingly much lower, but the cheating rates went 
up to 30-35%3. Ultimately 282 subjects completed the 
study – 347 participated, but 65 used mobile devices to 
complete the survey so their data was not usable. 
                                                          
3 This explanation is further supported by the difficulty we had in getting 
the initial batches of participants who received extra credit to come 
collect their cash payments. University policy required that we collect 
in-person signatures when providing payments and as such, the 
participants had to come to our office to receive payment. In the pilots 
with extra credit, multiple follow-up emails were required over the 
course of many days to get the students to come get their money. When 
they were only incentivized with monetary rewards, they appeared much 
more eager to come get their cash. Interestingly, however, many students 
under both reward mechanisms never did come get their money. 
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PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
In analyzing the 282 subjects, we found some interesting 
trends in the preliminary results, however very little 
attained statistical significance. To investigate, a power 
analysis was performed to ascertain if the sample size was 
sufficient for the effects. Since the total number of 
subjects per cell is determined by the number needed to 
get a certain number of cheaters in that cell at the 
observed cheat rate, the power analysis was conducted on 
the subset of the sample that cheated. An estimate of the 
effect size for each metric on the pairwise t-tests for 
cheaters were calculated by taking the average of each 
pairwise mean difference and dividing by the pooled 
standard deviation for that metric (Cohen 1988). The 
mean overall effect size for cheaters was then calculated 
by taking the average across each of the measures level 
effect sizes (Cooper and Hedges 1993, p. 241). The 
overall estimated effect size value that was arrived at was 
0.35. This is about halfway between the estimates of 
small (0.2) and medium (0.5) effect sizes for a t-test 
statistic (Cohen 1988, 1992), which was taken as evidence 
of face validity for the purposes of this power analysis. 
The power for the tests on the data that were collected 
was then calculated using the Cohen (1988) method and 
this estimate of effect size, yielding a power of 0.29. This 
indicates that the current experiment was substantially 
underpowered (Cohen 1988, 1992). A generally accepted 
value for sufficient power is 0.80 (Cohen 1992). To attain 
this level of power with our estimated effect size, we 
would need 102 cheaters per cell. Given our observed 
cheat rate of approximately 30-35%, we would thus need 
an overall sample size of approximately 300 per cell. A 
follow-up study has been conducted using Mechanical 
Turk in order to facilitate collecting so many subjects per 
cell. 2,500 subjects were collected: 7 cells at 300 per cell, 
plus a buffer to account for potential device filtering 
issues (e.g., a laptop with a touchscreen). We are 
currently analyzing this data. 
CONCLUSION 
This research in progress note reports on the design and 
execution of a study in HCI-based detection deception. 
The objective of the study was to examine the impact of 
knowledge of tracking and countermeasures on the neuro-
motor changes detected when subject commit a 
malfeasant act. To examine this, an experimental context 
and design was required that would afford the subjects an 
opportunity to commit an un-sanctioned malicious act 
while tracking ground truth in an unobtrusive manner. 
While the initial data collection did not yield much in the 
way of significant results, the experimental context and 
design was found to be robust and potentially useful for 
others. Subsequent data collection has taken place and 
results will be reported in the future. 
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